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Summary findings
The  Uruguay  Round  agreements  on agriculture  were  are  still prevalent  in both  industrial  and  developing
intended  to move  member  countries  toward  a fair  and  countries.
market-oriented  agricultural  trading  system.  By  In many  countries,  the  operations  of these  state  trading
progressively  reducing  domestic  government  support  and  agencies  tend  in practice  to nullify  the intended
export  subsidies,  converting  nontariff  barriers  to tariffs,  objectives  of the concessions  on market  access reached  in
and reducing  barriers  to market  access,  members  were  the  Uruguay  Round.
committed  to reducing  distortions  in world  agricultural  And  there  are still significant  price  distortions  in trade
trade  and  in preventing  new distortions  from  arising.  in products  subject  to state  trading.
But state  trading  enterprises  with  monopoly  power  or
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Merlinda  ingco  and  Francis  Ng
1.  Introduction
The Uruguay Round (UR) agreements  on agriculture  were intenided  to move member countries
toward the goal of establishing  a fair and market-oriented  agricultural  trading system. Through  a process
of progressive  reduction in internal  government  support and export subsidies, conversion  of non-tariff
barriers  to tariffs, and reduction  of  barriers  to market access,  members  committed  to reduce distortions
in world agricultural  trade and to prevent  additional  distortions  from occurring.
It  is only now, however, that it is apparent how countries have actually implemented  their
generalized  commitments.  Analysis  of actual implementation  of the UR agreements  in agriculture  show
evidence of the ways the implementation  process creates new opportunities  for mischief and greater
efforts on the part of anti-liberalization  forces.  An important issue relates to the operations of state
trading  enterprises  (STEs)  and their potential  effects  to circumvent  the UR market  access concessions  and
commitments  to reduce exports  subsidies. Since  little was done durinig  the Uruguay  Round to bring more
discipline  to the activities of state trading enterprises,  their effects onl  the effectiveness  of the new UR
rules in practice becomes a critical issue. In addition, the ongoing accessions to the World Trade
Organization  (WTO) of major  developing  countries  with state  trading higlhliglht  the need to examine  STEs
and how to reduce  their distortionary  effects on trade.
Based on 108 reporting countries,  we evaluate in this paper the potential distortionary  effects of
STEs in agriculture and their abilities to circumvent  the UR concessions  on market access. Alternative
policies and multilateral  rules to reduce the distortionary  effects of STEs are also discussed.  Section 2
briefly reviews the GATT/WTO  rules on1  state trading. These include  regulating  the activities of STEs,
constraining  their abilities  to restrict trade and allowing  their distortionary  effects to be challenged  under
the WTO dispute-settlement  procedures. A theoretical  analysis  of potential  distortionary  effects of STEs
and the extent of these distortions  in major countries  are reviewed in sectioni  3.  Section 4 provides an
inventory  of country and product coverage of STEs and their importance  to trade.  Alternative policy
options  for future multilateral  reforms  in the next Round  are discussed  in section  5.  Section  6 concludes.
12.  GATTAWTO  Rules  on State  Trading
This section briefly reviews the GATT rules on1  STEs under Article XVII. How the rules have
been inadequate  in disciplining  the behavior  of state trading agencies with monopoly  or exclusive rights
are discussed. The inadequacy  is partly due to the vagueness  of thie provisions  and poor compliance  on
STE notifications  requirements.
Since the  General Agreement on  Tariffs and  Trade (GATT) was  first  drafted in  1947,
governments  and state trading enterprises  have been recognized  as legitimate  participants  in world  trade--
both as market regulator and economic  agent. As market regulator, governments  impose trade policies
governing  market access of foreign  goods;  and as market  agent, engage  in exports or imports.  However,  it
was recognized  that governments  or state-owned  or controlled  entities enjoying monopoly  or exclusive
trading rights can engage in activities that effectively foreclose market access or create restrictions to
trade.  Some countries attempted  to limit the role of STEs, but failed as many other countries relied on
these  entities for their control  on trade (US/GAO,  1995).
The GATT rules that emerged did not outlaw state trading, but a  series of obligations are
imposed. The most important  requirements  include  the obligation  to operate in a manner consistent  with
the general principles of non-discrimination,  to make purchases or sales solely in accordance with
"commercial  considerations"  and to supply information  about the operations  of state trade enterprises.
Information on trade covered by STEs has to be provided  to tile GATT Secretariat on the basis of a
questionnaire  adopted in 1957 and revised in 1960.  The rules are contained in Article XVII which
established  guidelines with respect  to the behavior of state trading and the obligations of contracting
parties.  In addition to holding STEs to the same disciplines  as other trading entitiesl, and allowing
foreign enterprises  the opportunity  to compete,  Article XVII mandates the transparency  of activities of
state trading enterprises. 2
Under  GATT/WTO,  non-discriminatory  treatment  generally  includes  most-favored-nation  (MFN)  and national
treatments.  MFN  requires  granting  to all members  the most  favorable  treatment  granted  to any single  member.
National  treatment  requires  treating  domestic  and  foreign  producers  equally.  In article  XVII,  however,  the  meaning
of non-discriminatory  treatment  is unclear.  The  United  States  maintains  that  state  trading  should  provide  both  MFN
and  national  treatment,  but other  members  contends  that  national  treatment  is not  required.
2 Notifications  are required  to be made  for all STEs. Any  member  which  perceives  that a trading  partner  has not
adequately  met its notification  requirements  may raise  the matter  bilaterally.  More  recently,  a revision  of the
questionnaire  for STEs  to provide  more  tranparency  have been discussed  in the Committee  on State  Trading
Enterprises.
2Article XVII is not restricted to STEs that are owned or controlled by the state.  Public ownership
is  not the  issue.  The focus  is on  the  behavior  of  entities  formally  granted  exclusive  rights,  special
privileges  or monopolies.  Agencies or private-owned firms that hiave in effect been granted exclusive
rights of privileges are also covered by Article XVII.  Hence, any member may notify entities or firms of
trading partners that are perceived to act as a STE on a de facto  basis.  However, Article XVII did not
provide a definition of  what constitute a "state trading enterprise".  As a result, what constitute a STE or
entities  subject to  Article  XVII have  beeni subject  to  different  interpretationis by  members.  This  is
apparent  in the  country  notifications  during  the  period  1980-1994 where  countries  appear  to  have
different interpretations of  what constitute a STE.
The Uruguay Round Agreement did not change any of the provisions in Article XVII. However,
a Memorandum, called. Understanding on Interpretation of Article XVII was included in the Agreement.
The Understanding provided a definition of state trading enterprises, implemented procedural measures to
improve compliance with Article XVII's  notificationi  requirement, and created a working party to review
country notifications.3 The working party shall review notifications and counter-notifications, review the
adequacy of the questionnaire in light of notifications received.
For notification purposes, member countries agreed to define state trading enterprises during the
Uruguay  Round  as:  "governmental and  non-governmental  enterprises,  including  marketing  boards,
which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges,  including statutory or constitutional
powers,  in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases  or sales the level or direction of
imports or exports"  (WTO, 1994).  All entities covered by this definitioni  are subject to the guidelines in
Article  XVII.  Under this  definition,  state trading  enterprises  include government  agencies,  statutory
marketing boards, export marketing boards, regulatory marketing boards, fiscal monopolies, canalizing
agencies,  foreign  trade  enterprises, and  boards and corporations  resulting  from nationalized  agencies.
Developed  countries  including  the  United  States,  Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Japan  have
recognized the existence of state trading in their countries.
Another  set  of  GATT/WTO  rules  governing  STEs  comprise  of  the  specific  commitments
included  in  accession protocols that  are made by  members regarding their  use or acceptance of such
3 A Working  Party was established  in 1995 under the Committee  on Goods and Services to provide a practical
understanding  of state  trading  as defined  in the Memorandum  and to explore  means  of ensuring  transparency  in STE
activities. The Working  Party has met several  times  to address  concerns  about the potential  trade distorting  effects
of some STE  practices,  inciuding  a complete  reformulation  of country  notification  requirements  and established  an
illustrative  list  of state trading  activities  (WTO 1995).
3entities.  In general, the specific commitments relate to  price mark-ups or privatization of state-owned
enterprises.  In  cases  where  any  member  perceives  that  an  STE  has  circumvented  previous  trade
liberalization  commitments,  the  WTO  allow members  to  challenige such  actions through  the  dispute
settlement procedures.
State  trading  enterprises  that  engage  in agricultural  trade  are  also  subject to  the  disciplines
contained  in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.  The Agreement required member countries
to reduce market access restrictions, export subsidies and domestic support including any such measures
provided  by  STEs.  In  particular,  the  disciplines on  market  access restrictions  contain  two  specific
references to STEs. First, the definition of non-tariff barriers subject to conversion to tariff equivalents
includes non-tariff measures maintained through STEs.4 Second, when providing notifications regarding
implementation,  members  are  required to  explain  the administration  of market  access  commitments.
Where such commitments are administered by STEs, details about the STE and its relevant activities are
required to be provided.  Third, under the export subsidy commitment, countries are required to reduce
their  budgetary  expenditures  on  export  subsidies and  their  quantity of  subsidized  exports,  including
subsidies provided by STEs.  In addition, export subsidies not subject to reduction cannot be applied in a
manner  that  allows  members to  circumvent  their commitments  to  reduce  export subsidies,  including
subsidies provided to or by STEs.  Fourth, member countries are also required to reduce their aggregate
measure of domestic support, including budgetary expenditures and revenue forgone by governments or
their agents.
Other sections of GATT 1994 also contain references to STEs.  For instance, countries that have
negotiated  with  other  GATT/WTO  members  to  provide  a  certain  level  of  protection  for  domestic
producers cannot allow their STEs to operate in a way that affords a level of protection greater than was
negotiated  (Article 11:4).  That is, STE importers should not grant protection above that given by their
bound tariff  schedules.  Also, references made in other GATT articles to import or export restrictions
include those  made  effective  through  STEs.5 In addition,  in the  Uruguay  Round, the  United  States
negotiated  an  exclusive  bilateral  agreement with  Japan that  sets  limits on the  price  mark-up that  the
Japanese Food  Agency could  maintain for  specified  commodities.  The Agreement,  however,  is less
explicit  on  the  disciplines  on  export credits  and  other  subsidies  administered  through  state  trading
enterprises.  Based on previous studies (US/GAO, 1995) and review of more recent country notifications,
there has been poor compliance on the rules to notify the existence and operations of STEs.
See Article  4:2 of the Agreement  on Agriculture.
See interpretive  note to GATT  articles  XI, XII,  XIII, XIV,  and XVIII.
43.  How  STEs May Circumvent  WTO Rules  and  Commitments?
This section provides a discussion of major policy issues on STEs and their potential effects to
circumvent  the  market  access  concessions  reached  in the  UR.  A  theoretical  analysis  of  potential
distortionary effects of STEs is also presented.
On the import side, the UR Agreement on Agriculture  mentions state trading in the context of
market access in a footnote to Article IV.2.  This provision stipulates that"members  shall not maintain,
resort to or revert to any measure  of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary
customs  duties".  The  footnote  clarifies  that  non-tariff  measures  maintained  through  state  trading
enterprises fall under this prohibited category.
An important issue is whether state trading operations tend to effective]y nullify in practice the
market access concessions reached under the  Uruguay Round.  The ability of STEs to distort trade  in
practice and effectively nullify the UR market access concessions stems in part from the ambiguity in the
GATT rules governing STEs. As discussed in section 2,  Article XVII states that state trading enterprises
are  expected  to  operate  based  on  "commercial  considerationis".  However,  what  constitutes  a
"commercial"  consideration is ambigous, as firms can use market power as a commercial practice.  In
addition, when  governments establish a  state trading monopoly, market  power is usually  used to  gain
advantage over other domestic and foreign competitors.  Given that market advantage, a state trader does
not operate  in the same  way as a  private enterprise.  Hence,  in practice, Article  XVII has  not  been
effective in modifying or disciplining the behavior of state trading enterprises.
In principle, the Uruguay Round Agreement in agriculture has introduced a way of reducing the
distortionary  effects  of  STEs.  First,  the  abolition of  non-tariff  barriers (tariffication)  under  the  UR
include the non-tariff measures imposed by these entities.  Second, Article 11:4  of  GATT 1994 states that
no price  mark-up  administered by  a STE importer slhould be larger than the  bound tariff.  Since few
agricultural tariffs were bound before the Uruguay Round, and countries were allowed to maintain non-
tariff barriers, STEs were able to effectively maintain high price mark-ups through non-tariff measures.
Under the Uruguay Round  Agreement in agriculture, the non-tariff measures  (including those
maintained by STEs) were converted to tariffs.  However,  since these new bound tariffs are very high in
5many  countries,  STEs, are still  able  to  effectively  maintain  hiigh price  mark-ups  and  domestic  price
protection in these countries.
An  obvious  but  important  policy  reform  for  the  next  Round  is, therefore,  that  of  a  further
reduction  in the remaining  high bound tariffs.  This approachi should automatically  limit the  level of
import price protection maintained by STEs.  If countries notify the level of price mark-ups administered
by STEs, it would be relatively easy to monitor the extent of import price protection by comparing price
mark-ups with bound tariffs.  Under this policy, state traders must sell imports on the domestic market at
no more than the border prices plus the tariff.
Further reductions in the UR bound tariffs,  combined  with a more strict implementation of the
Havana Charter would impose further discipline on the extent of import protection maintained by STEs.
Two provisions of the Havana Charter (Article 31:4 and 31:5) are relevant.  Article 31:4 called for an
analysis  of  import  costs  and  profit  margins  of  import  monopolies.  Article  31:5  stated  that  import
monopolies would "import and offer for  sale such quantities of the product as will be sufficient to satisfy
the full  domestic demandfor  the imported product..."  In simple terms, this implies that STEs canot be a
further impediment to trade.  This, combined with Article 11:4  of GATT (disciplines on mark-ups) seems
to impose some discipline on STEs in most cases.  That is, if a STE did not import to meet demand, the
evidence would  manifest  itself  through a  mark-up  higher than  that  allowed.  Although  this  may  be
difficult to show in practice.
Based  on  the panel  decision  between New  Zealand  and  Korea on  beef  in  1989, the  issue  is
clouded  by  quantitative  restrictions  or tariff  quotas.6  The  panel  explicitly  stated  that  it  would  be
inappropriate to apply Article 11:4  when there is a quantitative restriction (and, at least from an economic
point of view, a tariff quota) as the protection is provided by the quantity rather than the in-quota tariff.
6Korea's  LPMO  was a beef import  monopoly  established  in July 1988,  with  exclusive  rights  for the administration
of both  the beef import quota set by the Korean  government  and  the resale  of the imported  beef to wholesalers  or in
certain  cases directly  to end users  such as hotels. The Panel examined  whether the mark-ups  imposed  on imported
beef, in combination  with the import duties collected  at the bound rate, afforded "protection  on the average in
excess  of the amount  of protection  provided  for" in the Korean  schedule  in violation  of the provisions  of paragraph
4 of Article  11,  as claimed  by New Zealand.  The LPMO  bought  imported  beef at world market  prices through a
tender system and resold it either by auction to wholesalers  or directly to end users.  A minimum bid price at
wholesale  auction,  or derived  price for direct sale,  was set by the LPMO  with reference  to the wholesale  price for
domestic  beef.
6According to the Panel, the price premium obtained by LPMO through the setting of a minimum
bid price or derived sale price was directly afforded by the situation of market scarcity arising  from the
quantitative  restrictions on beef.  The Panel concluded that because of the presence of the quantitative
restriction, the level of the LPMO's  mark-up of the price for imported beef to achieve the minimum bid
price  was not relevant  in the case.  The panel stressed,  however, that  in the  absence  of quantitative
restrictions, an import monopoly was not to afford protection, oni  the average, in excess of the amount of
protection provided for in the relevant schedule, as set out in Article 1[:4  of the GATT.  Furthermore, in
the absence  of quantitative restrictions, an  import monopoly was not to charge on the average a profit
margin which was higher than that "which would be obtained under normal conditions  of competition"
(in the absence of the monopoly). In principle, STEs could no longer maintain quantitative restrictions in
agricultural  products  as  a  result  of  the  Uruguay  Round  Agreement  in  agriculture.  By  converting
quantitative  restrictions  (and  other  non-tariff  measures)  into tariffs,  STEs  could  not,  in  principle,
maintain protection higher than the new bound tariffs.
A  stronger  discipline  which  requires  STE  imports  until  the  difference  between  import  and
domestic  prices does not exceed the bound tariff  means that the state importer will act  similarly as a
private trade under a fixed import tariff.  In addition, a strict stipulation that the STE must meet market
demand would rules out tricks like selling a fixed quantity at a price that falls below the binding, while
generating a domestic market price above the binding.
On exports,  an important  issue relates to whether there  is circumvention  of commitments  on
export subsidy reductionis.  The Agreement on Agriculture does not mention state trading in the context of
exports.  During the Uruguay  Round, some members had  suggested  for greater  transparency  that  of
introducing into Article 9 (export subsidy commitments) a specific obligation to notify details of exports
of  commodities  by  state  trading enterprises.  This  was rejected  by  the  participants  involved  in state
trading.  They referred to the notification system which already existed under Article XVII for all sectors,
including  agriculture.  Under the  present  notification  requirement to  the  Committee  on  Agriculture,
exports by state trading enterprises fall under the general notification requirement as described in table
ES I and ES2 in the document on notifications accepted by the Comm itte on Agriculture.  In practice, this
implies  that  the  details  on  exports  by  state  trading  enterprises  will  not  be  available  through  this
notification.  Recently,  complains  by  members  have  been  expressed concerning  some  practices  by
marketing boards in third country markets which are not linked to the traditional kind of export subsidies.
It is claimed that these practices have the effect of export subsidies but are allowed by the WTO.
7The types of export subsidies which are subject to reduction commitments are defined  in Article
9 of the Agreement  in Agriculture.  If a state trading enterprise receives  such subsidies, they would be
subject to reduction.  In addition, Article 10 stipulates that export subsidies not listed in Article 9 shall not
be applied in a manner which results in, or which threatens to  lead to, circumvention of export subsidy
commitments.  This is also applicable to state trading enterprises.  A problem that needs to be addressed
is the lack of transparency concerning state trading.  Traditionally, marketing boards and STE exporters
do not release information on their export sales.  However, some of these sales are subsidized. Because of
this  lack  of  transparency,  it  is  very  difficult  to  monitor  thle export  subsidy  involved  in  a  given
transaction.7 This  problem  is made  worse by  the  practice used  by  state trading  enterprises  to  pool
revenue from all export sales and to distribute the revenue to farmers.  Under this  conditions, eventual
circumvention of the commitment to reduce subsidized exports or to keep subsidies at a zero level cannot
be verified.
Many participants believe that more transparency is needed and that some details (e.g. acquisition
price on the internal market, selling price on the world market) should be supplied if requested in the
Committee on  Agriculture, especially under Article  10:3 (preventioni of circumvention)  and also under
Article  18:6 of the Agreement  on Agriculture  (right of participants to raise  any matter relevant to the
implementation of commitments).  The lack of transparency lhas  been justified by members having STEs
by the confidentiality needed to operate in the world market.  Other exporters however, do not claim a
similar degree  of confidentiality for their exports.  The wheat sector is perhaps a good example.  There
are five major exporters on the world market for wheat.  Two of them have STEs which keep details of
transactions  confidential.  The  other  three  are more  transparent.  Two  countries  in the  latter  group
subsidize exports, but the amount of subsidies is published and their selling prices are known.
Another problem is the fact that in the past, compliance with Article XVII notifications  has been
very poor.  Circumvention of reduction commitments  only could be verified by details  on volumes of
individual transactions, their level of subsidies and sales prices. The present questionnaire does not cover
these  points.  In the past, those elements have not been  supplied, also  not in the framework  of those
notifications under Article XVII.
7 The lack of transparency is justified by the concerned countries by the confidentiality needed to operate on the world market.
Other exporters, however, which do not have boards, do not claim a similar degree of confidentiality for their exports.  It is
actually the private trade which in their case makes and carries out sales.  In the wheat market for instance, there are five major
exporters on the world market. Two of them have trading boards, which keep details of transactions confidential.  The other
three ar more transparent.  Two countries in that latter group subsidize exports, but the amount of their subsidies is published and
their selling prices known.  In addition, these latter countries would be ready to supply on request more detailed information on
export transactions to the Committee on Agriculture.
8The  Uruguay  Round  Agreement  does  not  exempt  countries  with  state  trading  from  their
obligation to provide information.  The request for information by members would not be made because
of state trade but because there is a serious doubt whether the exports by the concerned country meet its
reduction  commitments.  The  obligation  to  supply  information  under  Article  XVII:4  of  the  General
Agreement  is triggered by other conditions when a party believes that its interests are adversely affected
by the operations of the state trading enterprises.  It is obviously not related to the reduction commitments
under the Agreement on Agriculture.
On  imports,  members will  have  to  ensure  that  new  applicants  commit  themselves  from the
beginning  of their membership to a system  in which the substantial part of imports  is executed by the
private sector and not by state trading enterprises.  In addition, tariff quotas sold to be under the control of
state trading agencies, unless specific conditions are agreed should ensure market access.  No country has
so  far claimed  that  the  notification  obligation  under  Article  XVII  of the  General  Agreement  would
preclude interested parties from asking questions under Article 18:6 of the Agreement on Agriculture, as
to whether or not imports by state trading enterprise are in conformity with Article 4:2.  It is likely that
the right to ask those questions will often be exercised, particularly after the accession of countries such
as Russia and China.
3.1.  POTENTIAL  DISTORTIONARY EFFECTS  OF STATE TRADING
Any evaluation of the trade distortionary effects of state trading are complicated by the various
measures that STEs use to control either a country's  production, imports and/or exports.  In addition, the
lack of transparency in the operations of STEs prevent a sophisticated quantification of their distortionary
effects.  Based on the review of the GATT/WTO country notifications and Trade Policy Review reports,
actual operations of state trading enterprises include assessment of levies on production and/or imports,
license requirements for exports, provision of government guarantees on borrowed funds, and provision
of  export  subsidies.  Other  state trading  practices  included  government  guaranteed  minimum  prices.
Some member  countries have justified  their state trading  enterprises by  thie need  to protect  domestic
producers against low-priced imports.  The variety of state trading practices makes comparisons between
countries difficult.  In addition, many types of STEs operate  in the world market, with  differences  in
operations such as import or export STEs, the types of industries,  size of operations, and the level of
government control or intervention.  This diversity makes it difficult to generalize about the distortionary
effects of STEs and their effects on particular markets or on the world trading system.
93.1.1  STE Activities and Behavior with  Potential  Distortionary  Effects
A significant number of STEs handling agricultural commodities appear to combine foreign trade
monopoly with mechanisms to influence domestic supply and distribution.  The major objectives of many
STEs  include  domestic  price  stabilization,  market  regulation, and  control  and  promotion  of  exports.
These  agencies  are  usually  producer  controlled,  government  sanctioned  monopolies  with  exclusive
authority to engage in intervention purchases of domestic production, control output prices, set producer
and consumer prices, influence domestic distribution and conduct imports and exports.  In general, the
state trading  agency has control  over the movement,  pricing,  quality standards  and  marketing  of the
products concerned.  In many agricultural markets, STEs usually obtain their power from their ability to
be price discriminators.
Policies implemented through state trading involve a wide variety of activities.8  In this section,
we identify and rank STE policies and activities in terms of their potential ability to distort trade.  The
STE operations  and characteristics listed in Box 1 and discussed in this section  are considered to have
the greatest potential to create trade distortions.
Box I
Potential  Distortionary  Effects of STE Operations
Most trade-distorting  STE operations
*  Administration  of price  support  schemes  for domestic  production  through  different  price schemes
*  Determines  the purchase  price and/or  sales  prices of domestic  production  and imports
*  Authorizes  or manages  production  and  processing  of domestic  goods
*  Purchases  and sales of all or significant  percentage  of domestic  production  based on the predetermined  floor
and ceiling  prices;  administration  of marketing  arrangements
*  Monopoly  on imports  and/or  exports
*  Maintenance  and administration  of quantitative  restrictions  and licenses  on imports  and/or exports
*  Provision  of export  credit  guarantees  and export  subsidies
o  Administration  of global  or bilateral  agreed  quotas,  phytosanitary  regulations  and  restraint  arrangements
*  Restrictions  on export  licenses
Least trade-distorting  STE operations
*  Quality  control  of domestic  production
*  Provision  of export-related  support  services  such as storage,  shipping,  handling,  processing,  and packaging
*  Promotion  and advertising  activities  for both  exports  and national  consumption
*  Maintenance  of emergency  stocks  of key staples
8 For a detailed discussion  of STE activities,  see WTO note, dated October 1, 1996,  "Draft Illustrative  List of the
Relationship  between  Governments  and STE  and STE  Activities,  Annex  I and 11.  G/STRIW/32  1996.
10Price support to producers.  A major role of STEs in many countries is to support the domestic policy
objective  of  price  and/or  income  support  to  producers.  To  attain  this  objective,  countries  impose
regulations on quantities and prices of traded goods. The mechanism used is usually through"guaranteed
or fixed prices" for outputs or inputs directly or indirectly administered by the STE or by the government
through  parastatal  organizations.  In  these  cases,  STEs  will  establish  floor  (minimum)  or  ceiling
(maximum)  prices which  will trigger their purchases of goods or their release of stocks.  Inherent  in
these  functions  is a  monopoly or monopsony power granted to the  STE in order to  insulate domestic
markets  from foreign  competition.  For STEs mainly engaged in import activities, the  STE has a sole
purchasing authority in the world market and monopoly selling rights in the domestic market.  In the case
of  STE  exporters,  the  policy  is  reversed  with  the  government  granting  parastatal  organizations
monopsony power in the domestic market and monopoly export rights or "single  selling desk" authority
in world markets.
In countries with price stabilization as a major objective,  a STE is also typically engaged in intervention
activities including management of stocks, buying and disposal of stocks and management of government
set targets for reserved stocks.  In many developing countries, state trading is used as a mechanism to
execute or operationalize "food security" objectives througlh cheap food policy. The latter policy involves
taxing producers and subsidizing consumers.  In this situation, STEs are viewed by governments  as an
effective  administrative  agency  to  implement  this  domestic  policy  objective.  This  usually  includes
transportation  and distribution of subsidized food and/or agricultural inputs. The practices of the Food
Corporation  in India and  BULOG in Indonesia, both have sole authority for'intervention  purchases of
domestic  production for grains and exclusive rights to import illustrate these types of STE operations.
Among the developed countries, activities of the Japan Food Agency provide additional  illustrations of
STE instruments with potential trade distortionary effects.
In the case of STEs engage in exporting, a number of developed country exporters  have  STEs which
engage in price pooling to support producer prices or minimize income risks to farmers.  The impact of
price  pooling  arises  from the  STEs ability to  create differences  between markets--particular  domestic
versus export markets,  but also between different sub-markets.  This can be consistent  with economic
efficiency  in the country, if for instance, an exporter discriminates to increase export returns.  However,
price  pooling within  season is costly  economically.  While  being justified  by  some strange  notion of
equity, price pooling creates costly distortions in storage markets.
11Under price pooling, the final price paid to producers by STEs is a blended price based on a net revenue
of all  sales  in  foreign  and  domestic  markets.  This allows  STEs  to  pay  producers  the  same  return
regardless of  the time of delivery during the marketing year.  Througlh  a system of delayed payments to
producers, STEs enjoy greater flexibility than private firms in discretionary pricing in world markets.
Exclusive  rights to buying and selling.  Typically, statutory regulations provide STEs with opportunities
unavailable  to  private firms that  compete against them.  In particular,  many STEs  maintain exclusive
rights to purchase and sell certain products destined for domestic and/or export markets.  Depending on
the objectives of STEs, this statutory power is often used to act as a monopsonist or monopolist, offering
producer prices lower than world market prices and/or selling to consumers at prices higher than world
levels.  Revenues and profits derived from these transactions are used by STEs to subsidize exports of
selected commodities in which it has monopoly or monopsony rights.  In addition, most STE exporters
have  exclusive rights to export sales of key products.  These exclusive export rights can  enhance the
monopoly powers and economic rents available to STEs and enhanlce  the practice of price discrimination
across  export  markets.  STEs  with  exclusive  rights to  buying  and  selling  usually  control  domestic
supplies,  hence  facing less uncertainty  in sourcing  supplies for exports than  other  competitors.  This
provides flexibility for STES in making long-term export arrangemenit  with importing countries.
Enjoys government  subsidies or guarantees.  Many  STEs enjoy special  privileges and facilities  from
their sponsoring governments.  These facilities  usually  include subsidies paid  out to cover  deficits on
price  payment  guarantees to producers and/or financial benefits that would not be available  to private
firms.  The funds could be used to reduce the prices of exports to gain an advantage in the international
market.  In some countries, the subsidies are used in isolated cases, such as during unusually low prices.
For example, the Canadian government provided financial assistance to Canadian Wheat Board during a
year  when  market  prices  were  low, thus reducing  the  impact of  low prices  on  producers.  In other
countries, the  subsidies are provided on a regular basis, resulting  in higher returns  and  production  of
subsidized producers.  Other forms of special privileges granted to STEs include special tax advantage,
transportation  subsidies,  and  interest rate  subsidies  lowering the  cost  of  STE borrowings  relative  to
private firms.
3.2  STATE  TRADING  AND  THE  IMPLEMENTATION  OF  URUGUAY  ROUND  COMMITMENTS  IN
MARKET  ACCESS
As discussed in the previous section, a major concern with STEs is that such entities may be used
through which governments may circumvent their commitments under the Uruguay Round agreement in
12agriculture. Unfortunately, neither the Agreement nor the country schedule of commitments spell out how
the various aspects of the trade regime will be implemented. The implementation in some countries, while
consistent  with WTO rules, is managing trade more than liberalizing it.  in practice, the conversion of non-
tariff  barriers  in  agricultural  products  is  implemented  by  the  adoption  of  tariff-rate  quotas.  The
Agreement on agriculture allowed discretion in the allocation of import rights at the lower in-quota tariff
rates.  In some countries, the tariff quotas are aliocated to state trading agencies or domestic producer groups
who has the right to determine the conditions of entry and, in some cases, the marketing channels used.  In
some cases, the quotas are allocated to domestic processors thereby insuring that the imported product does
not have direct access to consumers.  Some countries have allocated the quotas to importers on the condition
that they buy a certain amount of domestic product.
During the  implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments  in market access,  many  STE
importers still enjoy exclusive or monopoly rights to import, purchase and sell certain key products.  In
many  cases,  it  is very  difficult,  if not  impossible to  evaluate  whether purchases,  both  domestic  and
imports, are restricted due to lack of demand or because of specific government policy such as domestic
protection.  In this situation, if the STE decides to keep control on sales and purchases, then tariffication
and/or tariff reductions may not necessarily enhance demand and improve market access.
Table  I  shows the number of tariff lines by type of TRQ administration.  The frequency  index
(Fm)9 showing the percentage of tariff  lines subject to specified scheme of TRQ administration  is also
9 The frequency  measure  provide  one way of capturing  the changes  in trade policies  and comparing  the policies  on a
country-by-country  basis. A frequency  index  and trade coverage  measure  for each type of allocation  scheme  will be
measured  as follows:
Fm  =  (  iD  N;  Nt) *  100
TCm  =  ((ZDit-r *  V  V. 11 )i* 100
where
Fm  =  frequency  index  showing  the percentage  of tariff  lines  subject  to a
specified  measure
TCm  trade  coverage  ratio  showing  the share  of total  imports  subject  to a
specified  measure
N;  =  tariff  line  i,
D;it,  =  dummy  variable,  I if one or more  NTB is applied,  0 otherwise
N,  =  total  number  of tariff  lines  in  a product  group
Vit-n  =  value  of imports  in  tariff  line  item  i in year  t-n
If r and m are zero,  the index is based on current  trade values,  otherwise  it is based on specified  base  year trade
weights. Holding  n constrant  and varying  r will measure  the effects  of changes  in protection  with  constant  trade
weights.
13estimated.  As shown in Table 1,  many of the newly established tariff-rate quotas in many countries are
administered  by a government agency  or a STE.
Based  on the WTO  notifications  by 33 countries  in  1995, table  1 shows the number  of tariff
lines  subject to tariff quotas in agricultural products establislhed under the Uruguay Round Agreement
classified first by nature of allocation (global or specific country) and second, by type of administration.
The percentage of tariff lines for each type of administration schleme  for all the tariff quotas established in
1995 are also shown.  The results can be summarized as follows.  First,  a significant proportion of the
tariff quotas established under the Uruguay Round are administered by importing countries.  Second, for
tariff quotas with specific country allocations, the most of the quotas are administered by a government
agency.  Several importing countries have allocated the tariff quotas to their state trading agencies.
In  many  cases,  the  government  agency  has  allocated  the  quota  rights  for  certain  products
exclusively to a state trading monopoly. Given that these STEs maintain monopoly or exclusive rights or
has significant control over domestic marketing, distribution, pricing, and other bottleneck facilities, the
commitments  on  trade  policy  reforms and  tariff  concessions  become  largely  irrelevant  in enhancing
market  access.  That  is, even  with zero  tariff  bindings  and  zero  quotas, the  STE has  the  ability  to
effectively foreclose domestic markets from foreign competition by influencing  prices of domestic and
foreign goods.  In addition, the state monopoly maintains the ability to impose high mark-ups on imported
products, thereby reducing domestic demand for imports.  Similarly, if STEs enjoy special privileges in
sourcing  domestic  outputs  and  inputs  and  prices  paid  are  below  market-clearing  levels,  the  STE
effectively receives a subsidy which may reduce market access opportunities for foreign products.
The country  notifications  on market  access  specifies  the tariff quotas  and the tariff lines  under  each tariff quota.
The number  of tariff lines  under  each tariff quota  were counted  by country.
14Table  1.  TRQ Administration  by Importers, No. of Tariff Lines and Frequency index by type of arrangement.
COUNTRY  GLOBAL  SPECIFIC COUNTRIES
Administered by Importers  Administered by Importers
Domestic  State  Traditional  Compound  Domestic  Government  State Trading  Marketing  Domestic  Not Notified
Industry  Trading  Importers  Producers &  Agency  Board  Board  Producer
State Trading  Group
Austria  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Barbados  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Brazil  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Canada  0  0  0  0  0  123  0  0  0  2
China  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Colombia  48  0  0  0  0  119  0  4  0  0
Costa Rica  0  0  0  0  0  11  0  0  0  0
Czech  Republic  0  0  0  0  0  46  0  0  0  0
El Salvador  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Finland  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Guatemala  0  0  0  0  0  6  0  0  0  0
Hungary  0  0  0  0  0  4  0  0  0  75
Iceland  40  0  0  0  0  57  0  0  0  0
Indonesia  1  0  0  0  0  4  1  0  0  0
Israel  3  0  0  0  0  21  0  0  0  0
Japan  39  0  24  0  59  98  24  0  0  0
Korea, Republic  0  0  0  0  0  19  0  0  0  0
Malaysia  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Mexico  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Morocco  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  32
New Zealand  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Norway  0  0  8  0  0  0  35  0  0  0
Philippines  5  1  0  0  0  13  0  0  0  0
Poland  0  0  0  0  0  254  0  0  0  0
Romania  0  0  0  0  0  7  0  0  0  0
Slovak Republic  0  0  0  0  0  38  0  0  0  0
Slovenia  0  0  0  0  0  33  0  0  0  0
South Africa  8  0  4  0  0  62  0  0  0  0
Swaziland  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Sweden  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Switzerland  240  94  0  0  0  446  164  0  0  19
Thailand  2  3  0  0  0  37  0  0  0  0
Tunisia  0  0  0  0  C  13  0  0  0  0
Turkey  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
United States  0  0  0  0  0  63  0  0  0  78
Uruguay  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Venezuela  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
European Union  4  0  88  0  0  11  15  0  0  267
Total  390  98  124  0  59  1485  239  4  0  473
(%)  13.58  3.41  4.32  0.00  2.05  51 71  832  0.14  0.00  16.47
Source: Autlors' estimates
As indicated in section 2, GATT  1994 imposed  limits on the extent  of protection  that  can be
extended to  STE importers.  Article 11:4  of GATT states that protection, on average,  should not exceed
the  amount  of tariff  protection provided for  in their tariff  scheduie.  This could  be interpreted as the
maximum  price  mark-up  which  can be  charged  when  imports  are  sold  in the  domestic  market.  In
addition,  the  Uruguay  Round  introduced  tariff  rate  quotas  as a  means  to  improve  access  for  those
products  subject to tariffication.  However, both of these  provisions  in themselves  do not  guarantee
improved market access.  For instance, STEs can satisfy the rule on1  maximum price mark-ups by simply
reducing  their  profit  margin  without  expanding  imports.  Second,  since  the  over-quota  tariffs  are
prohibitively  high, as is the  case  in many countries,  imports  only enter  within the  minimum  access
commitments.  Third, in countries where existing preferential arrangements are included in current access
commitments, the possibilities for increased market access remain limited.
15GATT/WTO rules allow STE monopoly importers to administer imports into a country provided
such  activities  are  carried  out  within "acceptable  commercial  practices."  But  what  is  considered
"acceptable commercial practices"?  The lack of transparency in STE activities and operations precludes
the determination  of specific distortionary  impacts and whether  operations are within the  spirit of the
Agreement.  The administration of tariff  quotas determine who gets the monopoly rent associated with
quota rights and licenses.  The legalization of tariff rate quotas following the Uruguay Round Agreement
makes import administration by STEs a major concern, especially due to the non-transparency that exists
in the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures with regards allocation of import quotas.
The tendency of member countries to establish new STEs to administer the implementation of the
new  tariff  quotas  following  the  Uruguay Round  is another  concerni.  The  Philippines,  for  example,
established a new STE to administer its commitments on meat tariff rates quotas.  Similarly, Taiwan set-
up new STE to administer its tariff rate quotas on rice and poultry products.  China recently re-introduced
state trading  in  oilseeds  and  oilseed products.  The  objectives  in all  these  appear  to  be  to  provide
exclusive purchase rights to STEs so that the government can maintain its control on trade flows.  These
activities preclude competition and impede the entry of new private firms.
Several  other STE activities and operations  can circumvent the general  WTO rules on  market
access.  Many of these entities control grades and standards of imported products.  Such control may lead
to discriminatory treatment against products of certain national origin, thus impeding the free trade  and
market access in these goods.  In addition, some members maintain multi-tiered foreign exchange rate
systems,  where  STEs are granted  preferential rates  for purchases. These policies  in effect  discourage
competition  at discriminates against private  importers, both domestic and  foreign.  In other  countries,
STEs  are occasionally  allowed to keep over-quota tariff  revenues or resale price  differentials.  These
STEs use the tariff revenues to subsidize other aspects of their own  operations to the disadvantage of
other firms.
4.  ESTIMATING  THE DISTORTIONARY  EFFECTS  OF STATE  TRADING
4.1  DISTORTIONS  BASED  ON  GATT/WTO  RULES
To estimate the trade distortion effects of STEs, one has to determine the extent of government
intervention resulting from STE operations and their effects on domestic production and total demand--
domestic and foreign.  For STEs which control imports, one approach in the literature follows the"tariff
16equivalence"  method which the distortion effect is measured by the equivalent effect on domestic prices
to a tariff.  Similarly, it could be argued that the distortion effect of a STE which controls exports can be
measured by the effect on domestic price equivalent to an "export tax or export subsidy equivalent".
Another  approach attempts to evaluate the effects of STEs based on specific GATT rules.  For
instance, based on GATT 1994 STE importers must operate in such a way such that domestic demand for
imports is satisfied and protection  granted should not exceed the bound tariff. In addition,  STEs should
behave like commercial firms and respect the principle of non-discrimination.  Based on these rules, the
analytical  task  is to  evaluate  whether domestic  demand  for  imports  is satisfied  and  whether the  STE
enjoys  more protection than  the bound tariff.  Whether the STE behaved "commercially"  is difficult to
define and evaluate in practice.  One way is to determine whether the STE imports to satisfy the level of
domestic demand  which would be faced by a private importer under competitive conditions.
The methodology for measuring protection is well developed in the literature. Given an import
demand  function for a product, the difference between the world price  level and the wholesale  price of
the  same  good  is  the tariff  equivalent  of the  import policies  which  operate  to  determine  the  import
quantity.  This  is  shown  in Figure  I  where  a  particular  STE  administers  imports  under  competitive
markets.  Given an excess demand (ED) faced by the STE and the excess supply curve (ES) which is
perfectly elastic at the world price (Pw), the tariff equivalent measures the impact of the STE on prices.
If the STE imports and sells at the same price as Pw, then there will be a zero tariff  equivalent.  If the
STE sells in competition with private importers, the tariff equivalent  would be equivalent to the actual
tariff applied to private imports. The effect of the STE on trade is measured by the reduction in the import
volume.
For STE exporters, the Uruguay Round Agreement mandates that they should not grant export
subsidies that would exceed their UR commitments. The question is whether the STE grants an export
subsidy  and  how  much.  The simple  analysis  of export  subsidies could  be employed  to  estimate  the
distortionary  effects  of STE exporters.  The  latter will have  an export supply schedule which  will be
observable  at  the  price  Pw  and  quantity  of  sales  Qo  (Figure  2).  Given  a  domestic  price  faced  by
producers, the degree of subsidy represented by export subsidy equivalent could be measured in the same
way as the tariff equivalent  in Figure  1.  The effect  on trade  is the amount by which  an export subsidy
equal to the subsidy equivalent would expand exports. The total expenditure on export subsidies provided
by the STE exporter is given by the per unit subsidy equivalent multiplied by the volume of exports.
174.2  DISTORTIONS  UNDER IMPERFECT  COMPETITION
The analysis  of distortions  and welfare  effects resulting  from STEs  with monopoly  power under
imperfect  competition  is complex. Monopoly  power resulting  from exclusive  rights granted  to STEs can
be exercised in several ways  which will affect trade flows. The major analytical  questions  include (a) the
effects on imports  and exports  of STEs  with exclusive  rights or monopoly  power in domestic markets  and
(b) use of monopoly  or monopsony  power in the world  market to influence  traded quantities  and prices.
The first question is analogous to a small country case, where the country STE does not influence
its terms-of-trade. In this situation, monopoly power of STEs in domestic markets are exercised in
several ways including control on supplies, distribution,  consumption,  and quantities traded.  Assume
initially that a STE has control on at least one of these functions.  Also assume that the STE does not
impose any quantitative restrictions on total imports and other firms can import additional quantities
above  the tariff quota or minimum  access  level to satisfy total demand. In practice,  this implies that the
STE does not restrict other  firms from importing over the  in-quota tariff.  For STE exporters,  assume
initially that UJR commitments  on maximum  export subsidies are satisfied.  The analytical  question  is
therefore  on the extent of trade distortion other than those resulting from hidden non-tariff barriers  and
export  subsidies.  In  this  case,  the  STE  with  monopoly  power  in the  domestic  market  may  restrict
production below the competitive level in order to raise prices.  However, other firms can engage in trade
and consumers  can purchase from abroad at the world price.  The STE would operate in such a way that
marginal cost of domestic production is equal to marginal revenue as given by the price of imports.  If the
STE does not enjoy any quantitative controls on total imports, then other firms can always satisfy their
needs from imports.  Hence, the quantity of total imports would be similar from that of competitive level.
The trade  distortion effect of the STE in the initial case of zero quantitative restrictions  or hidden  non-
tariff barriers would be minimal.
Consider  another  case  of  STE  with  monopsonist  power  and  exclusive  rights  in  purchasing
domestic  production. To minimize cost, the  STE monopsonist would buy  less from domestic  suppliers
than  under  a competitive market condition.  The STE would capture rents from purchasing  less of the
domestic  product at lower prices than the cost of imports in order to equate its marginal cost  of buying
from  the  domestic  market  with the  world  price  inclusive  of tariffs.  In practice,  this  usually  require
imposing export restrictions or ban on exports.  However, if other domestic firms can engage in exports,
the STE monopsonist loses its market power.  Therefore, the distortion and trade  effect of monopoly or
monopsony  power  of  STEs  in  the  domestic  market  arises  from  the  existence  of  non-tariff  barriers
including hidden quantitative import and export restraints.
18This  leaves  the  case  of  STEs  with  monopoly  power  on  trade.  Consider  the  case  of  STE
monopoly operating to maximize profits or rents by influencing or controlling trade. If the objective of
the STE is to maximize profits by exploiting consumers, then even in the case of a small country with no
influence  on world prices,  the  STE would impose trade  restrictions  equivalent to  a tariff  or an export
subsidy.  For a  STE importer, the  rent-maximizing tariff  equivalent  would  be the difference  between
marginal and average revenue on the domestic market.  The volume of imports would be lower than the
free-trade  level.  Thus, the distortion effect can be measured by the size of the tariff  equivalent  of the
policies  in-place.  Conversely,  if the  STE  monopolist  engages  in  trade  by  exploiting  producers,  the
equivalent  policy would be a  subsidy on  imports to  reduce domestic  prices until the marginal  cost of
buying from domestic suppliers is equal to the world price.  The level of rent-maximizing subsidy would
be the difference between the supply price and the marginal cost of purchasing from domestic suppliers.
In this case, the trade distortion effect would be measured by the import subsidy equivalent.  If the STE
monopolist  also  controls domestic  marketing and  decides to exploit consumers,  imported  products  are
sold domestically  at  a high price  and  domestic product are purchased  at the  low price.  With  product
differentiation,  the  trade  and distortion  effects should be measured accounting  for product  prices  and
quality differences in imports and domestic goods.  The distortion effect can be represented or proxied by
measures of producer or consumer subsidy equivalents.
Consider another case where  a STE has monopoly rights on trade and is supporting a country's
domestic producer price or income support policy.  In this case, rents are transferred from consumers  to
producers and the STE.  If the STE operates to support domestic prices above the competitive  level and
rents are distributed to producers in the form of higher prices, the impact on trade would be equivalent as
in the case of production controls or quota.  The distortion effect in this case would be represented by the
tariff equivalent,  measured as the price gap between the higher domestic price and the world price.  A
third case is that of a STE operating in support of cheap food policy or "food security" objective.  Here,
the STE with trade  monopoly  and  controls on marketing  or distribution  sells  imports at low domestic
prices through imposition of import subsidies or export taxes. The distortion effect would be represented
by the subsidy or tax equivalent.
In a large country case where a member country is large enough to influence  its terms of trade,
the  distortion  and trade  effects  are more difficult to  measure  in practice.  In this  case, the  STE with
monopoly power on trade faces a demand curve which is the sum of the domestic  and foreign demand,
and  is less than perfectly elastic.  The STE monopolist operates in such that  its total marginal costs  is
19equivalent to its total marginal revenue.  Profits in this case could be increased by restricting production
and driving up the world price.  The effect on trade flows can be represented by a producer tax equivalent
on domestic  production,  where the  height represents  the degree  of monopoly  power in domestic  and
world market.  In practice however, controlling domestic production in the absence of trade restrictions is
not likely to result in trade distortions.  The STE monopsonist  likewise has some market power if world
prices  are  influenced  by  the  restriction  of  purchases  on  the  domestic  market.  With  restrictions  on
domestic purchases, imports and world prices would increase.  Here, the trade effect is due to restrictions
on domestic production and can be represented by a producer tax equivalent measure.
Consider a profit-maximizing  STE with monopoly or monopsony powers on trade.  Assume also
that the  STE has  the  power to  discriminate  among  markets  and  impose  optimal trade  taxes.  In this
situation,  the  STE monopolist  would  operate  such that  its excess  supply  curve  is equivalent  with  its
marginal export revenue function and would impose an optimal export tax.  A STE monopsonist  would
equate its excess demand schedule with the marginal import cost function and impose an optimal import
tariff.  The distortion effects would be represented by a tariff equivalent of the optimal tax/tariff policies.
Figure 5 illustrates a measure of the "true" rate of protection when a tariff or price mark-up are
imposed on all importables  under the case of differentiated products and three classes  of commodities:
exportables  (P(x)); importables  (P(m)); and purley domestic  goods ((P(H)).  When a price  mark-up or
tariff  equivalent to t is imposed on all  importables, the price ray  corresponding to the  P(m)/P(x)  price
ratio  rotates  from OT  to  OT'.  The price  ratio  rotates  such that  the  new  ray  OT'  is above  the  old
equilibrium point by an amount equal to the length (l+t)  of the nominal price mark-up or tariff.  To reach
a new  equilibrium (at point  B), the intersection of OT' with  HH,  the  price of exportables  relative  to
domestic goods decline to  1/(l+d), while the price of importables relative to domestic goods increase to
(l+t)  / (I+d),  where d is the increase in the price of domestic or home goods.  The increase in the price of
home goods is larger, the stronger the elasticity of substitution between importables and home goods.
4.3  PRICE SUBSIDY EQUIVALENTS  ON PRODUCTS  SUBJECT  TO STATE  TRADING
As  discussed  in  the  previous  section,  many  state  trading  enterprises  administer  directly  or
indirectly  their  respective  country's  domestic  price  support  schemes.  In  these  countries,  domestic
producer prices, prices at which STEs buys and sells, export prices or some combination are most often
fixed and administered by the STE.  A simple indicator  of  the extent of price distortions resulting  from
STE operations  is the tariff equivalent of market price support  measures or price  subsidies extended to
products under STEs.  If the STE importer controlled  domestic  marketing  as well, importables  may be
20sold to consumers  domestically at P(m) while purchasing home goods from domestic producers at low
prices (P(d)).  Under differentiated products, the trade and price distortion effects of STEs are estimated
as the producer subsidy equivalents (Dixit and Josling, 1997).
Table 2  shows the estimates  of  producer subsidy equivalents of major  agricultural products
subject to STEs in several developed and developing countries.  The coverage of countries and respective
products include only those which have submitted country notificationis to the WTO.' i  To compare the
changes  in the extent  of subsidies provided after the completion  of the  Uruguay Round Agreements,
estimates of subsidy equivalents during the pre-Uruguay Round period (1988-94) and in 1995, following
the implementation of the agreements are presented.
Has the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements resulted in a decline in the magnitude
of  subsidy equivalents for major agricultural products subject to STEs?  In developed countries, current
estimates  indicate  that, except in a  few cases, the  magnitude of average subsidy  equivalents of major
products  have  declined  during  the  first  year  of  implementation.  However, the  extent  of remaining
subsidies and distortions resulting from these subsidies are still very large in many cases.  Among the few
cases where  the subsidy equivalents appear to have increased in  1995,  Japan's  rice and  milk sectors
showed the largest increase.
Table  3 summarizes our estimates of tariff equivalents of price subsidies including price mark-
ups on major products under state trading in countries where information are available for the year  1995.
The estimates of tariff equivalents of price subsidies shown in Table 3 indicate that state trading agencies
in the  countries  covered  tend  to  set  domestic  selling prices  above  world market  prices,  resulting  in
subsidies to producers.  Imported products are sold by STEs at a fixed, above world market price levels,
resulting in  protection for domestic producers, which is paid by consumers.
For state trading agencies engage in exports, the analysis indicate that domestic  prices are set or
maintained  at  above the  agencies'  export price (i.e.  world prices)  of a  given  product. The agencies'
monopoly  gain  on  domestic  sales  are  used to  raise  the  revenue  of the  domestic  producers  and  thus
becomes an implicit production  subsidy.  Likewise, export subsidies result from guaranteed minimum
reference prices for purchases from producers, to the extent that such prices are above prevailing world
prices.  State  trading  agencies which  administer  domestic  price  support  schemes essentially  provides
protection to domestic producers.  Imports are sold based on determined mark-ups, equivalent to a tariff
Estimates  will be updated  as country  notifications  to the WTO become  available.
21in order to maintain the domestic production subsidy.  The country notifications indicate that in almost all
cases, the volume of imports is determined based on market requirements to compensate for any shortfall
in domestic production, the level of whicll is usually influeniced  by some forn  of producer subsidy.
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23Table 2
Prmducer  Subsidy or Tax  Equivalents of products subject to STEs  in selected  developed and developing countries, percent.
Product  Groups  wheat  rice  coarse  grains  beef  nfilk
Pre-UR  1995  Pre-UR  1995  Pre-UR  1995  Pre-UR  1995  Pre-UR  1995
Developed  Counties
Austalia  4.50  6.40  6.70  5.60  4.62  5.03  9.41  5.18  18.50  24.70
Canada  62.10  29.40  0.00  0.00  39.82  18.62  22.70  13.60  81.70  62.20
Finland  80.10  79.00  0.00  0.00  74.66  79.71  80.26  72.64  83.60  81.00
Japan  98.00  103.00  89.40  97.10  98.80  99.30  48.90  46.70  85.90  90.50
NewZealand  16.30  1.00  0.00  0.00  3.36  1.00  7.71  2.11  4.00  1.60
Naway  85.60  73.10  0.00  0.00  54.20  47.90  84.60  79.93  88.70  85.70
Sweden  43.70  30.00  0.00  0.00  45.35  51.54  61.06  51.65  73.90  69.00
Switzerland  84.40  80.70  0.00  0.00  89.07  77.15  87.16  88.66  82.50  86.10
Turkey  51.30  -6.40  0.00  0.00  7.14  1.57  8.90  39.98  26.10  50.30
United  States  45.40  22.50  48.70  39.70  22.58  11.63  6.40  5.11  62.50  43.90
Developing
Colombia  87.20  21.00  50.30  27.50  -7.40  -5.30  21.80  41.40  19.70  19.80
Argentina  -1.80  4.20  0.00  0.00  -2.30  3.80  -6.30  6.80  0.00  0.00
Ecuador  O.00  0.00  -8.80  -10.10  -22.80  -60.20  23.30  -19.10  0.00  0.00
Paraguay  -40.10  11.50  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Bolivia  10.77  -422.16  -657.91  -46.25  -906.58
Peru  56.83  0.00  9.62  1.75  -150.35
Mexico  53.90  31.81  32.78  -22.46  24.69  5.22  -5.17  -44.73
Brazil  43.20  95.10  8.10  -78.10  0.00
Venezuela  0.00  39.50  70.70  0.00  0.00
Egypt  46.40  73.90  12.10  -22.80  -48.30  -71.10  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
morocco  52.00  6Z20
Tunisia  47.00  0.00  302.00  0.00  22.00
South MAfica  -22.40  0.00  -11.80  0.00  0.00
Malaysia
Thailand  4.73  -23.03
Indonesia  21.83  4.64
rindia
Czechoslovakia  -22.50  0.00  -16.10  76.80  4.70
Hungary  -14.20  0.00  -23.20  53.40  25.10
Poland  -38.80  0.00  -19.20  -69.50  O.Q0
Romania
Source: Authors' Estimates,  based  on basic  data from  OECD,  USDA,  and World  Bank  documents.
24Table 3.  TariffEquivalents  of Price Subsidies  and Mark-Ups, percent,  1995
Australia  Canada  Japan  New Zealand  Norway  Switzerland  Turkey  United States
wheat  00  00  5807  00  1379  2746  -16.2  6.0
rice  0 8  00  503 1  0.0  0.0  0 0  0.0  0.0
coarsegrains  00  0.0  2557  0.0  69.  51  8  -1.8  00
beef  0.0  47.0  00  0.0  109  4  304 1  58 4  45.7
milk  31.0  104 3  398 1  0.0  10(S  7  336 0  56.1  65.6
other meat  0.3  6.4  69.5  20 0  157  6  189 0  24.9  0 0
sugar  -158  00  58.4  00  0 0  769  13.1  -4.6
Source: Authors' Estimations
5.  State Trading Enterprises  in Agricultural  Trade
This section attempts to answer the following questions: Whichi countries have  STEs and what
products are under their control?  How important are STEs in practice as an instrument of protection and
source of  market  distortions in agricultural trade?  To date, there  has been no cross-country  study of
STEs in both developed and developing countries.  This mackes  it difficult to quantitatively evaluate the
prevalence of STEs in trade and the extent of their potential distortionary effects.  To evaluate the latter,
specific information  on STE behavior, activities and transactions  level data such as price mark-ups are
required.  Unfortunately, these types of data are not readily available.  The analysis in this paper is based
on information  from various  sources including WTO country  notifications and  Trade Policy Reviews,
agriculture and commodity reports prepared by trade attaches in the Foreign Agricultural  Service of the
US Department of Agriculture (USDA/FAS),  and World Bank country documents and internal reports.
In  accordance  with  Article  XVII,  member  countries  are  required  to  submit  responses  to
questionnaires on  state trading activities every 3 years.  In addition, members  are required to  provide
notifications  of any changes  in STE operations during  intervenin1g  years. Compliance  by members on
notification requirements between  1980 and 1994 were very poor.  During this period, only a total of 45
countries  submitted either  a  full or updating notifications.  Out of the  45 countries,  only 3 countries
(Finland,  Sweden  and Norway)  provided full notifications  for  all five of the  full reporting  years.  26
countries only submitted three or fewer times during the period, with eight countries reporting only once
during the period.1 2
During 1995 through July 1997, only 35 countries notified the WTO about their STE operations.
These notifications  indicated that a total of 121 state trading enterprises were involved in state trading in
12 See WTO,  G/L/128,  October  28, 1996.
2535 countries.  Twenty of these countries listed state trading for grains and eleven countries notified  the
presence of state trading in dairy products.  State trading were also reported in other agricultural products,
including cotton, fisheries, forest products, horticulture, livestock and meats, oilseeds and vegetable oils,
and  some  tropical  products.  The extent  of  state trading activities  based  on  these  figures  are  likely
underestimated because of the remaining ambiguity in interpretinlg  the new WTO definition and because
many members have yet to submit their notifications.
Tables 4 and 5 summarizes the range of products under STE operations in developing countries.
The data indicate  that  although STEs exist in manufacturinig  and services industries, agriculture appears
to  be the most  important  category  of products  under  state trading  in both  developed and  developing
countries.13 A review of country notifications suggests that the emphasis oln agriculture  in state trading
activities  stems  from  countries'  agricultural  policies.  And  because  these  agricultural  policies  were
generally exempted from GATT disciplines prior the Uruguay Round Agreement, it was futile in practice
to have tight restrictions of STEs which carried out agricultural trade  policies.  This gave room for the
possible use  of STEs  as administrators  of non-tariff  barriers allowed  under  Article  XI:2 and perhaps
prevented the strict application of Article 11:4  to agricultural trade.
The importance and role of STEs vary significanitly across countries.  State-owned  enterprises
accounted for about 13 percent of GDP in a sample of 65 developing countries during the late  1980s, as
compared  with  about  6  percent  in  a  group  of  10  developed  countries  (World  Bank,  1995).  How
important  are STEs in world  agricultural trade?  Evidence based  on a review  in developing  countries
shown in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that many STEs affect trade in agricultural products.  This is reflected in
both  formnal  exclusive  rights  or de facto  monopoly  rights or  special  privileges through  control  over
domestic sources of supplies, inputs, marketing and prices.
We evaluate  the extent  of  STE control and  potential  distortionary  effects  on  trade  based  on
several indicators, namely  (1) the number  of commodities covered  under  STE operations;  (2)  market
share of STEs on key products; (3) whether the STE has monopoly control or exclusive rights; and (4)
existence of non-tariff measures  used by the STEs.  Based on these indicators, we ranked the operations
of STEs in individual countries as "strong", "medium" and "weak".  A "strong"  status implies that the
country has a long list of commodities (over 30 product categories) under extensive  STE controls, with
13 However,  it is likely that STE operations  are also prevalent  in manufacturing  and services sectors,  but accurate
analysis  is prevented  by lack of information  and low  compliance  on country  notifications  on STEs. Service  sectors
seems  implicitly  not included  in the STE  notifications.
26exclusive rights or import monopoly on many items, and with significant market share in key products.  A
category "weak"  means that only one or two sectors or a few commodities  (less than  5 product items)
were under  STE control.  In addition, the STE concerned may not lhave exclusive rights or monopoly
preference  on  imports  or those  items  have  been  in a  process  of phase-out  or  deregulation  under  a
government  reform  program.  The category "medium"  is  in between the  strong  and  weak category.
Under a  medium  status, the  country is  still maintaining  STEs  in trade  witlh quite  many  commodities
covered and granted  exclusive rights or monopoly power are applied to certain  items (between 5 to 30
product items).
Table 4 also summarizes the ranking of STE operations and potential distortionary effects in 45
developing  countries.  Based  on  the  extent  of  commodity  coverage  and  existence  of  monopoly  or
exclusive rights,  seven developing countries (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Glhana, Hungary, India, Kenya, and
Nigeria)  are considered to have STEs with strong control on trade and potential significant distortionary
effects. Sixteen developing countries examined (Costa Rica, Cote d'lvoire,  Dominican Republic, Egypt,
Indonesia,  Mauritius,  Mexico,  Pakistan,  Peru,  Romania,  South  Africa,  Sri  Lanka,  Tunisia,  Uruguay,
Venezuela, and  Zimbabwe)  have STEs  which are  considered under "medium"  status.  Out of the  16
countries,  8  countries  have  STEs  with  monopoly  power  and  exclusive  rights  on  several  important
products.  The other 19 developing countries in the sample are classified as having"weak"  STEs mainly
due  to  few commodity  coverage.  However,  8 of these  19  countries  have  STEs  which  are  granted
monopoly power or exclusive rights on trade in key product items.  Hence, the potential distortionary
effects of STEs in these countries may still be important on these key product markets, despite the fact
that few commodities are covered under STE control.
Although the data on value or volume of trade carried out by STEs are very limited based on the
WTO Trade Policy Reviews,  tables 4 and 5 indicate that a significant amount of  agricultural trade were
carried out by STEs in several countries.  For example, about 30 percent of Bangladesh's  imports on
foodgrains, edible oils, and raw meat were under state trading in early 1990s.  In India, about 28 percent
of  total imports of rice, wheat, cereals, edible oils and fertilizers were under state trading during the same
period.  STEs in Peru accounted for about 20 percent of total imports in rice, cocoa, fish and fertilizers.
Similarly,  about 20  percent of  Tunisia's  total  imports of foodstuffs,  tea,  coffee, vegetable  oils  and
tobacco  were under state trading.
On exports,  STEs also accounted for  important shares  in total  exports in several  developing
countries.  For example, STEs in Bolivia accounted for 45 percent of  total exports in rice, sugar, coffee,
27raw wool and yarns.  About 38 percent of  Dominican Republic's  total exports of rice, wheat flour and
sugar were under state trading.
We now turn to the review of  country notificationis  on state trading submitted to the WTO during
a more recent period: 1995-1997.  Table 6 provides a summary of state trading enterprises, their product
coverage and market share of STE trade in total trade in these products for selected industrial countries.
As shown, a wide range of products are under state trading in major industrial countries. Among these
countries, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United States appear to have the
largest number of  STEs and/or largest number of products under state trading.  As described in Box  1,
the operations of STEs in these countries indicate potential substantial effects on the extent of domestic
protection and distortions in trade in major agricultural products.
In many of these products, the state trading enterprises have significant shares in total trade in the
products concerned, with several countries indicating STEs accounting  for  100 percent of country's  total
trade  in several key commodities during  1992-95.  It is interesting to note that, while many products
under  STEs  are  agricultural  goods,  other  products  such as electricity,  gas, chemicals,  minerals,  and
petroleum are also under STEs in several industrial countries (see Table 6).  Many of these STEs have
monopoly  or exclusive  rights in trade  in these  products.  In the case  of Canada, the  Canadian Dairy
Commission (CDC) maintained exclusive import rights in dairy products following the implementation of
Canada's minimum access commitments under the Uruguay Round.
Although  a  tariff  rate  quota was established  under  the UR minimum  access  commitment  for
butter,  the exclusive allocation of all import licenses to the state trading monopoly (CDC) would likely
limit in practice the extent of market access in the Canadian market for butter despite the implementation
of  commitments  made  under  the  Uruguay  Round.  Similar situations are  likely  in other  industrial
countries where the tariff rate quotas established under the Uruguay Round are administered by the state
trading monopoly and/or  the import licenses under the TRQ are exclusively allocated or granted to the
state trading  enterprise with exclusive rights.  The prevalence of this  phenomenon where  STEs act as
administrators of  UR minimum access commitments in agriculture are discussed further in section 4.
The  WTO  country  notifications  sometimes do  not provide  complete  information  on  existing
STEs.  For  example,  although  the  Australian  notification  provided accurate  review  of  state  trading
enterprises,  several entities  which qualify as STEs are excluded.  These include the Australian  Barley
Board,  which controls  feed  and malting  barley; the West Australia Grains  Pool which  has  monopoly
control  over  all  grains  in  Western  Australia  except  wheat;  GRAINCO,  the  Queensland  STE  which
28controls certain non-wheat grains and GRAINCORP, the New Southl  Wales STE which similar functions
as GRAINCO.
For developing  countries and transition  economies, table  7 summarizes the range of  products
under state trading and STE's market share in trade in these products in 30 countries.  The results indicate
that many STEs with exclusive rights are still maintained by developing countries and that trade in a wide
range of products  are under the control of these enterprises.  More importantly, many of the STEs appear
to hold monopoly power or exclusive rights in trade  in many products, as indicated by the estimates of
market shares.  While the market shares of many STEs appear to have declined in recent years, a number
of STEs also appear to have increased their shares in total trade in several products in recent years.  For
example, the trade share of the Turkish STE in barley trade increased from 75% in 1992-94 to 100%  in
1995.
There  are other  STEs in  developing  countries  which  are  also  not reported  in WTO  country
notifications.  For example,  in Indonesia, in addition to BULOG, the national  logistics agency  which
controls  trade  in  most major  agricultural  commodities,  the  Clove Coordinating Agency  (BPPC) and
APKINDO also meet the working definition of a STE.  BPPC seeks to manage the domestic market and
controls  all  clove  production  and  imports. All  imports are  barred,  though  smuggling  is likely  given
Indonesia's  higher domestic prices compared with world prices.  APKINDO, the wood products trade
association is non-goveirnmental enterprise which has been granted exclusive rights to export plywood to
certain markets, particularly South Korea, Japan and Europe.  Its major purpose is to fix prices in export
markets.  Through its export licensing role, APKINDO controls about 70 percent of the world market in
hardwood plwood.
6.  Alternative  Policies  or Multilateral  Rules  to Reduce  Distortionary  Effects  of State
Trading
A  more  effective  approach  to  reduce  the  incidence  of trade  distortions  due  to  STEs  with
monopoly power or exclusive rights is to eliminate the source of their distortionary power rather than
through rules governing their behavior.  An obvious approach would be to abolish their monopoly powers
on imports.  While STEs could continue to exist,  they should not have exclusive import rights.  Policy
rules that  outlaw  monopoly rights,  exclusive  or discriminatory allocation of  the new tariff-quotas  in
agricultural products to state trading monopolies  would also reduce their  distortionary effects on trade.
Furthermore, member countries could establish new rules which allow private firms to compete with the
29state trading body  as a component of the further liberalization  of trade.  For example, members should
implement their market access commitments under the Agreement in Agriculture such that the new tariff
rate quotas are allocated to private firms on a non-discriminiatory basis and not to government agencies or
state trading monopolies.  This would improve the ability of otlher countries to monitor the performance
of STEs and generate interest groups that  promote liberal trade within the importing country.
Hoekman  and  Low  (1997)  provide  an  excellent  discussion  of  alternative  approaches  for
disciplining state trading with exclusive rights.  They reviewed current approaches including binding STE
mark-ups,  requiring  trade  expansion  commitments  in  counltry  accessions  and  sector  specific
commitments.  Alternative  approaches  suggested  by  Hoekman  and  Low  include  the  following:  (i)
continuing to allow state trading but focus more tightly on their behavior; (ii) adopting tighter restrictions
on the creation of state trading enterprises witlh special privileges; (iii) adopting countervailing  actions
and remedies; (iv) provision of compensation to trading partners when an STE is established.  According
to  Hoekman  and  Low,  adoption  of  countervailing  remedies  is  undesirable  and  that  the  alternative
approaches could  potentially provide better outcomes.
In agricultural trade,  one way to effectively reduce the market power of STEs is to expand the
quantity of  the new  tariff  quotas  until the  monopoly  power hias no binding  effect.  Expanding  the
magnitude of  imports under  the minimum access provisions such that actual imports are determined by
the lower in-quota tariffs  would reduce the ability of STEs to maintaini high import protection.  Hence,
further expansion in the tariff quotas and rules defining obligatory imports under minimum access would
reduce the distortionary effects of  STEs.
The Uruguay Round Agreements did not specify how the tariff quotas would be allocated.  New
policy  rules  governing  a  non-discriminatory  allocation  of  import rights  under  the  new  tariff  quota
mechanism would be another way of challenging the power of STEs.  The key is to expand the required
import quantities under the minimum access commitments beyonid  the level which the STE would choose
to  import.  Rules requiring  the  minimum  access provisions  as obligatory  imports  would  reduce  the
distortionary powers of STEs.
In the  case of  STE exporters,  a different  strategy would  be required. One  important  issue  is
whether the STE exporter is in violation of liberal trade.  If the STE can restrict sales of another country
exporter below the competitive level, then this may be treated as a matter of internal competition policy.
If  the monopoly power of the STE exporters extends to international markets, and can influence the sales
to and from others,  then some regulation at the multilateral level seems necessary.  However,  in practice
30the STE exporter usually exports into a competitive market, and there is little need for multilateral rules in
this situations.  Trade liberalization by opening up markets should further weaken the monopoly power of
particular  STE  exporters.  In  developinig countries,  many  marketing  boards  have  been  deregulated
recently to allow the private sector to compete in export markets.  Appendix I provides  a summary  of
recent reforms in STEs in developing countries.
In agriculture,  an  important  issue  for  STE exporters  for the  next  round  arises  not  from the
descriminatory  practice of  monopoly power but with the covert subsidization of agricultural  exports.
The United States has complained  that Canada's  Wheat Board undercuts US exporters in world markets,
by subsidizing exports.  The issue is therefore a more simple one of monitoring and further reductions on
export subsidies.  For STEs,  the provision of finanlcial  assistance to STE exporters should be  explicitly
included as an export subsidy under the rules in the Uruguay Round Agreement.  The export subsidies
extended to these STEs should have been included into their schedules of commitments.  If the process of
reducing such export subsidies continues during the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement,
then the issue of the subsidized STE exporters will disappear.  In a number of countries, the state trading
export  activity  results  from  the  presence  of  STE importers  and  some  from  the  existence  of export
subsidies  in other  countries.  Abolishing the monopoly power of STE importers and  further  reducing
overall export subsidies may reduce the attractiveness of establishing or using STE to conduct trade.
Overall,  multilateral rules to  strengthen the monitoring  of STEs and their  activities, including
introducing  stronger  disciplines under Article  XVII (e.g.  increased transparency)  would be  needed to
reduce the trade distortionary effects of STEs.  As mentioned above, the notification procedure  under
Article XVII is woefully inadequate and has no teeth partly because of the vagueness of the provisions
and because the Article has not been used to claim nullificationi,  althouglh  it surely must as shown through
the Trade Policy Reviews.
7.  Conclusions
While permitted under Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, state trading
monopolies are not permitted to operate in such a manner as to distort trade.  We evaluate in this paper
the prevalence of state trading enterprises in agricultural trade, their potential trade distortionary effects
and their abilities to circumvent the Uruguay Round concessions on market access.  We conclude that
state trading agencies  with monopoly  power or exclusive rights are indeed very  important  in trade  in
major  agricultural  products  in  both  developed and  developing  countries.  The analysis  in this  paper
indicate  that  the  operations  of  these  agencies  effectively  result  in discriminatory  practices  and  high
31protection of domestic products over imported goods.  Based on1  estimates of tariff equivalents of price
subsidies extended  to  major products  under  state trading,  the analyses  indicate that  significant  price
distortions remain in trade in these products.
In principle,  the abolition of non-tariff barriers under the  Uruguay Round would have reduced
the distortionary powers of state trading monopolies.  Governments could no longer claim that their STE
is maintaining  a  non-tariff  barrier.  In addition,  under  Article  11:4  of the  GATT, the  price  mark-up
imposed by state trading importers could not be larger than the bound tariff submitted under the Uruguay
Round tariff schedules.  The analysis in this paper indicate that the operations of STEs with monopoly
power or exclusive rights may tend to effectively nullify in practice the intended objectives of  the market
access concessions reached under the Uruguay Round.
The  notification  procedure  under  Article  XVII  is woefully  inadequate  and  has  no  teeth  in
disciplining distortionary behavior of STEs partly because of the vagueness of the provisions and because
so far, with one exception, the Article has not been used to claim nullification, although it surely must.
There is a need to strengthen the monitoring of STE operations and disciplines under Article XVII.
Based on actual implementation, the new established tariff rate quotas under the Uruguay Round
minimum access commitments-have increased the scope for state trading in agricultural trade.  Based on
the WTO country notifications, new STEs have been established in a number of countries.  The analysis
of TRQ administration and allocation schemes indicate that in a large number of countries, the new tariff
rate quotas are administered by a STE with monopoly power or a government agency.  Or  in many cases,
the  import licenses are allocated or granted  exclusively to a STE with exclusive rights or government
agency.
32Table 4: Summary of the Status of State Trading Enterprises for 45 Developing Countires
State Trading Enterprises  Sector Covered
Country  Status Monopoly  Regime  %Import  % Export  Agric  Manuf  Serv  Major Agricultural Products
Argentina  Weak  No  M/X  ..  ..  X  Grains,  meat
Bangladesh  Strong  Yes  M  30%  ..  X  X  Foodgrain, edible oil, raw matl.
Bolivia  Strong  No  MIX  9%  45%  X  X  X  Rice,  sugar, coffee, raw wool, yams
Brazil  Weak  No  X  ..  ..  X
Cameroon  Weak  Yes  M/X  ..  ..  X  X  X  Cotton, wheat flour, fertilizers
Chile  Weak  No  M/X  ..  ..  X  X  Wheat
Colombia  Weak  No  M  5%  ..  X  X  X  Agricultural inputs
Costa Rica  Medium  Yes  M/X  ..  ..  X  X  X  Rice, wheat, mazie, beans, sugar
Cote d'lvoire  Medium  Yes  M/X  ..  X  X  X  Wheat flour, rice, ref. sugar, coffee, cocoa, cotton
Czech Repu  Weak  No  M/X  X  X  Foodstuffs
Dominican  Medium  Yes  MIX  23%  38%  X  X  Rice, wheat  flour, sugar
Egypt  Medium - Yes  M  ..  ..  X  X  Wheat, flour, tea, edible oils, fats, tobacco, wood
El Salvador  Weak  Yes  M  ..  ..  X  X  Sugar
Ghana  Strong  No  M/X  ..  ..  X  X  Foodstuffs, beverages, fertilizers
Hong Kong  None  No
Hungary  Strong  Yes  M/X  ..  ..  X  X  X  Grains, oilseeds
India  Strong  Yes  M/X  28%  6%  X  X  Rice,  wheat, cereals, edible oils, fertilizers
Indonesia  Medium  Yes  M/X  ..  ..  X  X  Foodstuffs, beverages, sugar, garlic, fertilizers
Israel  Weak  No  M  ..  . X  Frozen meats, edible offal
Kenya  Strong  Yes  M/X  ..  ..  X  X  X  Cereals, sugar, fertilizers
Korea  Weak  No  M/X  ..  ..  X  Beet: tobacco, ginseng
Macau  None  No
Malaysia  Weak  Yes  M  ..  ..  X  Rice
Mauritius  Medium  Yes  M/X  9%  ..  X  X  Rice, flour, staple crops, fertilizers, fruits
Mexico  Medium  Yes  M  ..  ..  X  X  Maize, milk powder, soybean, sorghum, oilseeds
Morocco  Weak  Yes  M  ..  . X  X  Oilseeds, tobacco
Nigeria  Strong  Yes  M/X  ..  ..  X  X  X  Cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, palm products, rubbers
Pakistan  Medium  Yes  X  ..  ..  X  Edible oils, fruits
Peru  Medium  No  M/X  20%  ..  X  X  X  Rice,  cocoa, fish, fertilizers
Philippines  Weak  Yes  M  ..  ..  X  Rice
Poland  Weak  No  M  ..  ..  X  Basic food, tobacco, spirits
Romania  Medium  No  M/X  ..  ..  X  X  X  Livestock, dairy products
Senegal  Weak  Yes  M  ..  ..  X  X  Rice
Singapore  None  No
Slovak Repu  Weak  No  X  X  Beef, port, dairy products, sugar, potatoes
South Africa  Medium  Yes  M/X  X  X  Wheat, maize, cereals, dairy prod., sugar, oilseeds
Sri Lanka  Medium  Yes  M  ..  ..  X  X  Wheat
Thailand  Weak  Yes  M/X  . X  X  Potatoes, garlic, tea, fish, plywood, tobacco
Tunisia  Medium  Yes  MIX  20%  20%  X  X  Foodstuffs, tea, coffee, veg. oil, tobacco
Turkey  Weak  No  M  ..  ..  X  X  Sugar, tobacco
Uganda  Weak  No  X  ..  ..  X  X  Coffee, food crops, timber, lint
Uruguay  Medium  No  M/X  ..  ..  X  X  X  Sugarcane, sunflower oil, potatoes
Venezuela  Medium  Yes  M/X  11%  ..  X  X  X  Sugar processing, milk
Zambia  Weak  Yes  M  ..  ..  X  X
Zimbabwe  Medium  Yes  M/X  ..  ..  X  X  Wheat, maize, beef, dairy products, cotton
Memo Items
STE status:  7  =>  5 Yes/ 2 No
Medi  16  =>13  Yes/ 3 No
Wea  19  =>  8Yes/  It No
None  3  =>  3 No
Source: GATT/WTO, Trade Policy Review, various issues, 1990-96.Table 5: State's Trading in Agricultural  Products by Country in 1990.
Products (S91'  Rev. 2)  Exporting Cotritnes  linporting  Countim,c  No. ot Exporier  No. of  Importer
00 Food & live animals  AIF<, EkiY, JOR, MWI, ML 1,  NER, PtL,  RO  M, SDN, SYK,  6  8
ROM  TGO, TUN, TUR
01 Meat & meat preparations  ALG, COM, COG, ETH, EGY,  BWA, NIC, NER, PER, TUR,  10  6
GHA, JAM, MLT, MOZ, PER  ROM
02 Dairy products & eggs  ALG, BDI, BEN,  BFO, BGD,  BRA, PAN, ROM, TUN  20  4
COL, COM, ETH, ECU, GHA,
IDN, JAM, MEX, MLT, NER,
NGA, PER, TUR, ZMB, ZWE
03 Fish & fish preparations  BEN, COG, COM, EGY, GHA,  BEN, BDI, BGD. BRA, GIN,  9  13
JAM,  MLT, MOZ, NGA  IND, MEX, MOR, MOZ, PAN,
ROM, SLV, URY
04 Cereals & cereal Prep.  ALG, BEN, BDI, BOL, BRA,  ALG, ARG, BOL, BRA. BWA,  27  18
BWA, COL, COG, CRI, CYP,  CRI, GUY, IDN, LSO, MDG,
DOM, EGY, ETH, GHA, GUY,  MOR, MWI, PAK, ROM, SLV,
JAM, MEX, MLT, MOR, MUS,  SYR, TUR, ZWE
MWI, NER, PER, ROM, SEN,
SYR, ZMB
05 Vegetables & fruits  ALG, BEN, COG, COL, COM,  AFG,  BEN, BFO, CRI. CYP,  15  25
DOM, EGY, GHA, GUY, MLT,  EGY, ETH, GIN, GHA, IND,
NER,  SDN, TUN, URY, ZMB  JAM, LSO, MDG, MOR, MWI,
NER, NIC, PAN, PAK. ROM,
SDN, SYR, TUN, TUR, VEN
06 Sugar & honey  AFG, BEN, BDG, COG, EGY,  BDG, BRA, CIV, CR!, DOM,  10  15
GHA, MOR, MOZ, ROM, SYR  ETH, GUY, IND, LSO, MDG,
MOZ, NIC, ROM, SLV, ZMB
07 Coffee, cocoa, & tea  BFO, EGY, MLI, MLT, ROM,  BDI, BDG, BOL, BRA. CAF,  9  24
SYR, TUN, URY, ZMB  CIV, CMR, COG, CRI. DOM,
ETH, IND, IDN. JAM, LBR,
LKA, MDG, MOZ. NGA, PAN,
SLE, TGO. TUN, TZA
08 Animal feeding & stuff  COL, EGY, JAM, LKA  BGD, BRA, BWA, NER, PER,  4  10
SEN, TGO, TUR, TZA, ZMB
09 Misc, edible products  ALG, BEN, EGY, ETH, GMB,  ALG, PAN, ROM, TUR  12  4
GUY, MDG, MEX, SDN, SYR,
TUN, ZMB
El Beverages  BEN, BFO, GHA, GMB, ETH,  ALG, BEN,  CYP, MDG, MOR,  9  7
NGA, ROM, SDN, SYR  PAN, ROM
12 Tobacco & products  AFG, ALG, BEN, BFO, COM,  ALG, BGD, CAF, CMR, COG,  14  11
EGY, ETH, GMB, MLI, NER,  DOM, EGY, NIC, PER, SYR,
PER, ROM, SDN, SYR  TZA
21 Hides & skins (raw)  EGY, ROM  BDI, BGD, BWA, ETH. KEN,  2  9
MWI, NER, PAN,  SDN
22 Groundnuts & peanuts  COL, CYP, EGY, JAM, LKA,  AFG, ARG, BFO, BRA, CMR,  8  17
MEX, ROM, VEN  CRI, GMB, ETH, MYS, MWI,
NGA, NEC, ROM, SDN, SLE,
SYR, TUR
23 Crude rubber  ALG, DOM, EGY, ETH, IND,  BRA, CMR, IDN, LKA, MYS,  9  8
IDN, MOZ, ROM, ZMB  NGA, PAN, TUR
24 Cork & wood  ALG, EGY, JAM, MLE, MLT,  COG, COL, ROM, TZA, UGA,  8  6
ROM, TGO, ZMB  ZMB
25 Waste paper & board  DOM, IDN, LKA, ROM  BRA, TUR  4  2
26 Cotton & fibres  BDG, DOM, EGY, ETH, IND,  AFG, BDI, BGD. BOL, BRA,  10  21
IDN, LKA, MOZ, SYR, TUR  CAF, CMR, COL, EGY. ETH,
GMB, IND, LKA, MOZ, MWI,
NGA, NIC, PAK. SYR, TGO,
TUR
27 Crude fertilizers  BDI, BEN, BFO, BOL, BUR,  BRA, CHL, EGY, ETH, GIN,  25  20
CMR, COG, DOM, ETH, EGY.  IND, IDN, JOR, KEN, LKA,
GMB, IND, IDN, JOR, KEN,  MOR, MOZ, MRT, MWI. PAK,
LKA, MOR, MWI, NER, NPL,  PAN, ROM, SEN, TGO, TUR
PAK, ROM, SYR, TUR, ZMB
29 Crude animal & veg matis  BFO, ETH, MOZ, MWI, PAK,  AFG, BWA, EGY, ETH, MDG,  10  11
ROM, SYR, THA, URY, ZMB  NER, PAN, PER, ROM, SLV,
TZA
County  Total:  221  2
Source: UN(1AI,  Handbook ot State Trading Organizations ot Developinig Countries. Vol. 1, 1990.
34Table  6. Summary  of State  Trading  by WTO  Notifications  of Article  XVII:4(a)  in Selected  Industrial  Countries
1994  Value  As% of
Country  Date  State Enterprise  Trading  Product  import  Export  (USS Mill)  Remark  Total  Trade
I........  .....................................................................................................................................................................................  .......................................................-..................................  ..............................
Australia  07/22/96  Australian  Dairy  Corp.  Milk powder,  cheese,  butter  x  243.4  23%
Australian  Dried  Fruits Board  Sultanas,  raisins,  currants
Australian  Honey  Bureau  Honey
Australian  Horticultural  Corp.  Nursery products,  avocados
Apples,  pears, citrus
Dried  vine fruit
Cheatnuts  & macadamia  nuts
Austalian M-es  & L;vestock  Conp.  Beef & 'aeal,  buffalo  meat
Lamb,  goat meats,  mutton
Live  cattle & sheep
Australian  Wheat  Board  Wheat  x  2235.8  99%
Australian  Wine  & Brandy Corp.  Wine,  brandy  & grape spirit
Wool Intemational  Wool  x  2210  5%
Queensland  Sugar  Corp.  Sugar  x  2231.7  81%
Grainco  - Queensland  based  agribusiness  Wheat  & barley,  sorghum
New South  Wales Grains  Board  Coarse  grains,  oilseed
Barley  sorgitum,  oats
Australian  Barley  Board  Barley, oats, peas. faba  beans
Lupins,  vetch  & canola
Grain  Pool  of Westem  Australia  Oats, faba  beans,  peas, linola
Barley, lupins  & canola
New South  Wales  Rice Marketing  Board  Rice  x  733.0  63%
Canada  09/29/95  Canadian  Dairy  Commission  Butter  m  1.4  69%
x  3.7  97%
Milk & milk  powder  x  84.3  94%
Freshwater  Fish  Marketing  Corp.  Freshwater  fish  x  37.6  37%
Importation  of Intoxicating  Liquor  Act  Alcoholic  beverages  m  177  7
Canadian  Wheat  Board  Wheat  x  2995 6  99%
Barley  x  476.3  100%
Euiopean Union  01/23/96  Electricite  & Gaz De France  Electricity  & gas  m  x
(France)  Entieprise  Miniere  et Chimique  Nlinerals,  chemicals  m
Potassium  fertilizers  m  x  270 tons ('000)
(Austria)  06/26/96  Austria Tabakwerke  AG  Tobacco  m
VOA  Alcohol  in
Iceland  01/15/97  State Alcohol  & Tobacco  Monopoly  Alcohol,  beer,  wine, spirit  m  13.5  100%
Spirit  x  0.6  100%
Tobacco  & products  m  13.6  100%
Japan  10/30/96  Agriculture  & Livestock  Industries  Corp.  Livestock,  raw silk,  & sugar  m
Skim milk  & powder  m  16.9  tons ('000)
Japan Food Agency  Wheat  m  6.4 tons (mill)
Rice  m  1.6  tons (mill)
Barley  m  1.8  tons (000)
Japan  Tobacco  Inc.  Tobacco  m  703.4
Salt  m  277.0
Ministry  of Intl Trade  & Industry  Alcohol  (>90%/.)  m  1.4
Source:  VTO Country  Notification  of STEs,  1995-97.Table  6:  Summary  of State  Trading  by WTO  Notifications  of Article XVII:4(a)  in Selected  Industrial  Countries
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Country  Date  State  Enterprise  Trading  Product  Import  Export  (USS  Mill)  Remark  Total  Trade
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New  Zealand  08/08/95  Apple  & Pear  Marketing  Board  Apples,  pears  x  326  100%
Hop  Marketing  Board  Hops  x  6.1  100%/6
Dairy Board  Butter,  cheese,  milk powders  x  3389.9
Kiwifruit Board  Kiwifruit  x  381.1
Wool  Board  Wool  x  1054.1
Meat  Producers  Board  Meats  x  2634.9
Game  Industry  Board  Deer  meat  & dear  antlers  x  182.5
Norway  09/12/96  Norwegian  Grain  Corporation  Grains,  feed  stuffs  m  84.2
A/S Vinmonopolet  Alcoholic  bevrrages  & spirits  m  x
Switzerland  12/06/95  Swiss  Butter  Supply  Board  Butter  m  5.2  100%
Federal  Alcohol  Administration  Distilled  beverages  m  15.1  100%
Federal  Office  of Agriculture  Bread  flour,  wheat  meal  m  0.1  100%
x  0.3  100%
United  States  09/29/95  Commodity  Credit  Corp.  Butter,  cheese,  dry  milk  m  156.1
x  406.6
Barley,  com,  oats  m  89.5
x  3968.3
Sorghum,  soybeans  m  14.5
x  4761.0
Wheat,  rice  m  89.3
x  4914.8
Roney,  sugar  m  663.S
x  135.7
Cotton.  rye  m  17.5
x  2286.6
Peanuts,  dry  beans  m  29.1
x  392A4
Sunfloweiseeds,  flaxseed  as  8.5
x  63.0
Federal  Helium  Program  Helium  x  100.4  mn3  (mill)
Isotioes  Prod  & Distr.  Program  Isotopes  m  88.2
x  103.8
US  Enrichment  Corp.  Uranium  m  518.1
x  1045.7
Naval  Petroleum  & Oil  Share  Reserves  Crude  oil, gas,  petroleum  prod.  m  43354.8
x  502.9
Strategic  Petroleum  Reserve  Crude  petroleum  m  38463.5
x  53.3
Power  Marketing  Administration  Electricity  3046.9 Revenues
Tennessee  Valley  Authority  Electricity  m  960.3
x  30.0
Strategic  & Critical  Materials  Stockpiles  materials  m  4324.6
Stockpiling  x  685.1
Sourcer  WTO  Country  Notification  of STEs,  1995-97.References
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